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2Abstract:
In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of improvements in political and civil rights 
for attracting foreign direct investment flows (FDI) into democracies.  I contend that 
advances  in  the  quality  of  democracy  –  specifically  those  concerning  civil  rights  – 
present  positive  but  decreasing  marginal  returns  in  attracting  FDI  inflows.   I 
empirically prove this proposition by using panel data regressions within the Latin 
American  and  Eastern  European  contexts  from  periods  following  their 
democratization (1991-2003).
Keywords:  foreign  direct  investment,  civil  rights,  democratization,  developing  nations, 
Latin America, Eastern Europe.
Overview
This study addresses the relationship between quality of democracy and the level of 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI inflows).  In particular, it examines how effective 
improvements in political and civil rights are to attract inflows of foreign direct investment 
for democracies.  I contend that advances in the quality of democracy -- specifically in the 
area of civil  rights -- present positive but decreasing marginal returns for attracting FDI 
inflows.  In other words,  as the quality of democracy progresses, the marginal returns to 
civil rights decline. I empirically prove this regularity in polities with recent democratization 
experiences --- more precisely by using panel data regressions within the Latin American 
and Eastern European contexts from periods following their democratization (1991-2003).  
Due to the evidence of decreasing returns to civil rights, I conclude that 1) countries 
that boost the scope of civil rights after democratizing (despite its diminishing but positive 
returns) are relatively more successful in attracting FDI inflows than those with extreme 
levels;  2)  politicians  and  policy-makers  should  expand  the  provision  of  civil  rights 
selectively if  the maximum impact  in  terms of foreign investment  (and eventually more 
3economic development through foreign direct investment) becomes a priority; and 3) despite 
the existence of diminishing returns, the impact of any increase in the scope of civil rights is 
almost always positive on the amount of FDI inflows. 
In order to extend the literature on the role of political variables in attracting FDI 
inflows, I estimate the impact of changes in the quality of democracy during the first stages 
of democratic consolidation on the behavior of foreign investment inflows.  After verifying 
the existence of decreasing returns to the quality of democracy – measured by the scope of 
civil  rights  –  new  venues  for  further  research  are  suggested  to  explore  why  and  how 
different components of civil rights can produce such a property (decreasing returns to civil 
rights).  
Politics and Foreign Direct Investment
Previous  studies  on  the  role  of  good  governance  or  other  political  variables 
(concerning democratic quality) in attracting FDI inflows have mainly concentrated on the 
relationship between FDI inflows and 1) type of regime (whether democratic or not); or 2) 
only one aspect of democratic consolidation or political condition (e.g., corruption, tests of 
expropriation, political risks insurance, tax incentives, and property rights).
   Using the first approach, several scholars have focused on determining the link 
between regime type and investor confidence (Jessup 1999; Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 
2003; O´Neal 1994).  For example, O´Neal (1994) finds that authoritarian regimes provide 
investors  with  higher  returns  of  profitability  in  developing  countries.  However,  overall 
investment flows are not generally related to regime type.  Likewise, Jessup (1999) argues 
that authoritarian regimes in developing nations attract more international investment.  On 
the other hand, Jensen (2003) concludes that democratic governments attract higher levels of 
4FDI. Between these divergent views, Li and Resnick (2003) were perhaps the first to suggest 
that democratic institutions can affect FDI inflows both positively and negatively. However, 
Li  and  Resnick  mainly  focus  on  the  role  of  property  rights,  arguing  that  increases  in 
democracy improve property rights protection, thus encouraging FDI inflows. Like Li and 
Resnick, another group of scholars tested the hypothesis that enforcement of property rights 
can increase the attractiveness of a host country for foreign investors (Biglaiser and Danis 
2002; Jensen 2003). 
The second approach has more recently incited debate among scholars. This research 
has  tended  to  move  away  from aggregate  FDI  flows.  Traditionally,  these  studies  were 
focused on the role of corruption1 in explaining FDI inflows.  New studies, however, include 
1 Some scholars conclude that corruption could provide incentives for investment, and consequently for 
economic growth (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968). Leff (1964), for example, addresses several positive effects of 
corruption on investment. First, corrupt practices encourage individuals to avoid bureaucratic delay.  Thus, 
transaction costs are diminished.  Second, bureaucrats who are “allowed” to receive bribes work harder. 
Therefore, a tendency toward competition and efficiency is introduced into the system.  While the first 
mechanism increases the likelihood that corruption is beneficial to growth only in countries where bureaucratic 
regulations are numerous, the second theory would operate regardless of bureaucratic performance.  In a 
similar vein, Huntington (1968) provides an interesting view on the nature of corruption as a product of the 
distinction between public welfare and private interest, which comes with modernization (defined as a 
transition from autocratic to more democratic government). Since modernization contributes to corruption by 
creating new sources of wealth and power, corruption in this sense is produced by a rise of new groups with 
new resources.  Thus, Huntington sees corruption as a natural path to assimilate new forces into the political 
system. In other words, corruption represents a natural and predictable outcome of the modernization process 
in a country.
However, other scholars emphasize the negative consequences of corruption on the economy, namely lower 
economic growth (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991; North 1990; Shleifer & Vishny 1993). For instance, 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) provide evidence that nations where skilled people must resort to rent-
seeking activities tend to grow more slowly.  For these scholars, talented and highly educated individuals will 
be more likely to engage in rent-seeking activities than productive work, with adverse consequences for their 
country’s economic health. Likewise, under the institutional neoclassical assumptions, corruption inhibits 
economic growth because it destabilizes rules and generates uncertainty for private investors (North 1990).
5tests of expropriation2 (Li 2009), political risks insurance3 (Jensen 2008), and tax incentives4 
(Li 2006).    
Democracy, Civil rights, Political rights, and Foreign Direct Investment
As  noted  above,  regime  type  and  specific  political  conditions  --  as  explanatory 
variables of foreign direct investment -- have been addressed in the literature.  Even when 
FDI flows have been disaggregated, regime type has always been a focus of every study, 
evaluating the relationship of a certain political or economic variable and FDI flows under 
democracy or autocracy.   In general, too much attention in the FDI literature has focused on 
regime type. 
However,  other  aspects  and features  of  the  quality  of  democracy or  the  level  of 
democratic consolidation may also matter when explaining FDI inflows.  In fact, some of 
these may better explain the role of democracy in attracting FDI inflows. More precisely, 
regime  type  cannot  determine  whether  (and  what  to  extent)  the  degree  of  institutional 
development  can  explain  the  amount  of  FDI  inflows  within  a  group  of  democracies. 
Variations  in  the  degree  of  institutional  development  or  democratic  quality  might 
considerably matter when explaining institutional effectiveness in attracting FDI inflows.  In 
addition, the marginal impact of improvements in institutional development on FDI inflows 
2 Through an analysis of actual expropriation acts of 63 developing countries from 1960 and 1990, Li (2009) 
shows that the chief executive’s political incentives, constraints, and policy-making capacity determine the 
host government’s expropriation decisions. 
3 By employing price data from political risk agencies, Jensen (2008) studies how domestic political 
institutions affect the multinationals pay for coverage against government expropriations. Jensen finds that 
democratic regimes are better able to reduce risks for foreign investors, specifically through enhancing 
constraints on the executive.
4 Li (2006) offers a theory that explains how regime type influences tax incentive policy in order to attract 
foreign direct investment. In general, Li shows that countries with better rule of law offer lower levels of tax 
incentives, and the effect is even stronger for more democratic countries.
6might  not  be  constant  or  fixed  over  time.  As  institutional  development  or  quality  of 
democracy increases, the impact on FDI – positive or negative – might also change. By only 
taking into account the type of regime, the study risks missing the potential existence of 
relevant dynamics in the relationship between democratic quality and FDI inflows.
Concerning more focused studies, different analyses on the role of either corruption 
or property rights only account for one aspect of democratic consolidation, not the level of  
democratic development as a whole (disaggregated into two general categories: political and 
civil rights).  In order to go beyond these limits and evaluate the implications of the level of 
democratic development on FDI inflows, the index created by the Freedom House Institute 
is employed. 
Despite of being often accused of a conservative bias, the Freedom House Index 
offers several advantages not present in other indexes: 1) it covers the entire period in which 
economic liberalization took place (in this project from 1985 to 2003); 2) it  evaluates a 
broad  range  of  characteristics  associated  with  democratic  consolidation  or  quality  of 
democracy; 3) it disaggregates its scores on democratic consolidation into two categories: 
political5 and civil rights.6  
5 Political rights in the Freedom House Index are measured using answers to the following questions: 1. Is the 
head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?; 2. Are the 
national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?; 3. Are the electoral laws and 
framework fair?; 4. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive 
political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or 
groupings?; 5. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its 
support or gain power through elections?; 6. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the 
military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful 
group?; 7. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral 
opportunities?; 8. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine 
the policies of the government?; 9. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?; 10. Is the government 
accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?; 11. Is the 
government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to 
destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?
6 Civil rights in the Freedom House index are measured through the answers to the following questions: 1. Are 
there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?; 2. Are religious institutions and 
7Thus, the Freedom House Index includes several political and civil rights seen in any 
democratic  consolidation  process.   Within  the  category  of  political  rights,  procedural 
democratic  features  such as  free  and fair  elections;  fairness  of  electoral  laws;  rights  to 
organize political parties; opportunities for the opposition to gain political power through 
elections; political and electoral rights of cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups; 
the  degree  of  corruption;  accountability  of  the  executive,  and  respect  for  the  ethnic 
composition of a country are all included.  
Likewise,  the  category  of  civil  rights  incorporates  other  procedural  democratic 
features  such  as  independence  of  the  media;  freedom  of  religious  institutions  and 
communities;  academic  freedom;  freedom  in  private  discussion;  freedom  of  assembly, 
demonstration, and open public discussion; freedom of organization for nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs); freedom of organization for trade unions and peasant organizations; 
independence  of  the  judiciary;  rule  of  law;  protection  from political  terror;  equal  legal 
treatment of various segments of the populace; state control of travel or choice of residence 
and employment;  right to  own property and establish private  businesses;  personal  social 
communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?; 3. Is there academic 
freedom and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?; 4. Is there open and free 
private discussion?; 5. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?; 6. Is there 
freedom for nongovernmental organizations?  (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, 
foundations, etc.); 7. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective 
collective bargaining?  Are there free professional and other private organizations?; 8. Is there an independent 
judiciary?; 9. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters?  Are police under direct civilian 
control?; 10. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by 
groups that support or oppose the system?  Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?; 11. Do laws, policies, 
and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?; 12. Does the state control 
travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?; 13. Do citizens have the right to 
own property and establish private businesses?  Is private business activity unduly influenced by government 
officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?; 14. Are there personal social 
freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?; 15. Is there equality of 
opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?
8freedoms  (including  gender  equality,  choice  of  marriage  partners,  and  size  of  family); 
equality of opportunity, and the absence of economic exploitation. 
The design of these indexes -- like the Freedom’s House Index -- can certainly help 
test theories on democratic consolidation.7  In particular, the Freedom House Index takes 
into account several aspects of procedural definitions of democracy8 (which herein are called 
political and civil rights). Any expansion of such rights has always been seen as normatively 
“good.”  Thus, this paper pushes beyond these normative considerations to evaluate whether 
political  and  civil  rights  can  increase  the  amount  of  FDI  inflows,  and  through  further 
investment, eventually foster economic growth.9  
7 In  general,  two  main  definitions  have  arisen  within  the  empirical  tradition  of  democratization  and 
consolidation:  the  minimalist  definition  and  the  other  procedural  definitions  of  democracy.   From  the 
viewpoint  of  the  minimalists,  democracy  is  a  system  whereby  the  population  votes  in  election  time  but 
concedes  political  power  to  govern  to  political  leaders  (Schumpeter  1942).  In  this  perspective,  Joseph 
Schumpeter essentially states that only certain minimal requirements must exist for a polity to be considered a  
democracy, such as free and fair elections. In other words, there must be competition.
Other procedural contributions expand the “minimal” requirements of the minimalist definition to include 
several aspects of political and civil rights of individuals participating in a polity. These factors are 
socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural and are not considered by Schumpeter’s (1942) minimalist definition 
of democracy.  Although the minimalist definition of democracy has tended toward more direct empirical 
applications (Przeworski et. al. 2000; Epstein, et. al. 2005), these conceptual additions of the more procedural 
definitions (e.g. Dahl (1971), Putnam (1994)), and others are now being considered seriously by several 
institutions and research centers. This is being done to build up new ways for measuring and comparing the 
degree of institutional development around the world (across countries and regions, and over time).
8 The Index, however, intentionally dismisses societal or cultural factors considered relevant by some scholars 
in the literature democratic consolidation literature.  Among these discarded concepts, I directly identify, 1) 
Putnam’s (2000) definition of social capital and its role as a predictor of democratic quality; 2) Dahl’s (1971) 
arguments on political cleavages and internal conflicts, elite and voter beliefs in democratic institutions 
(legitimacy), levels of trust and confidence in each other, and beliefs in either strictly competitive or strictly 
cooperative politics as relevant determinants of democratic consolidation. In addition, other social variables 
traditionally relevant in the literature on democratization such as capitalist development (Moore 1966; 
Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens 1992) and economic development (Przeworski 1991) are excluded from 
the Freedom House Index. In short, the Freedom House Index is focused on providing an evaluation of 
democratic quality, rather than an explanatory analysis.
9 Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) show FDI to be a relevant medium for the transfer of technology, 
contributing relatively more to economic growth than domestic investment.  Likewise, Bengoa and Sanchez-
Robles (2003) find the same positive relationship between economic growth and foreign direct investment. 
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles employed a panel data analysis on a sample of 18 Latin American countries in the 
period 1970-1999. 
9Along with the benefits of the Freedom House Index noted above, the use of this 
index  provides  additional  advantages.  First,  the  political  rights  index  concentrates  on 
characteristics pertaining to the type of regime such as free and fair elections, fairness of 
electoral laws, rights to organize political  parties, and opportunities for the opposition to 
gain  power  through  elections  (which  could  be  to  some  degree  accounted  for  by  the 
minimalist definition of democracy) that have been traditionally measured through the use 
of a dichotomous or a trichotomous variable (Schumpeter 1942). Conversely, the political 
rights  index allows for additional  variation (based on a 1 to  7 scale),  which could help 
provide a more precise and detailed estimation of marginal increases in FDI inflows due to 
improvements in the scope of political rights of a polity.
In general,  the opening of the political  system,  a product  of  the democratization 
process,  immediately  allows  for  substantial  improvements  in  enforcing  property  rights, 
judicial decisions, and the rule of law. This provides political information that is necessary 
and relevant for potential foreign investors as they decide where to invest. Considering this 
argument, I put forth the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis  1:  Because  most  of  the  gains  in  political  rights  are  associated  with  the  
democratization  process  (and  only  democracies  are  being  primarily  analyzed  in  this  
study), I do not expect to find a statistically significant impact for changes in political  
rights on FDI inflows. 
Second, the use of civil rights in this paper also contributes to testing and empirically 
analyzing  several  implications  from  the  democratization  literature.   The  concept  of 
individual “civil rights” has been broadly employed within the literature to characterize and 
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determine the degree of democratic quality or state of democracy in a polity.  Most of these 
follow normative or ideological considerations (Fonte 1997; Layton 2000; Kotlowski 2001; 
Delton 2002). 
The institutional characteristics employed by the civil rights index differ from those 
in the political rights index by their thematic orientation.  In general, while institutions in the 
political rights index ensure democracy at the macro-institutional level, the characteristics 
considered by the civil rights index measure the degree of state intervention at the micro-
level. An example would be state policies regarding institutions and rules that affect civil 
society and individuals. 
Although  the  index  does  not  provide  an  endogenous  measurement  of  “civic 
community” as Putnam might have wished, it does render an exogenous evaluation of state 
regulations in societal life, which could concern foreign investors.  In particular,  judicial 
independence, the rule of law, freedom of organization for nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs),  freedom of  organization  for  trade  unions  and peasant  organizations,  protection 
from political  terror,  equal  legal  treatment  of  various  segments  of  the  population,  state 
control of travel or choice of residence and employment, and rights to own property and 
establish private businesses directly affect foreign financial interests. 
This study contends that an overall expansion of civil rights would produce positive 
but decreasing marginal returns to civil rights in attracting FDI inflows.  10  The presence of 
positive but decreasing returns to civil rights can be explained by contrasting those rights 
that increase transactional and labor costs with those that strengthen the rule of law.  In 
10 Indeed, Freedom House´s disaggregated data on the level or scope of civil rights -- by type of civil right -- 
(which has become available only for four years), indicates that the scopes of every type of civil right are 
highly correlated among them. The existence of this regularity makes this empirical study relevant. 
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general, foreign investors expect legal guarantees for their investments, and are particularly 
interested in strong rule of law and an independent judiciary.  Credible legal guarantees for 
investments  are  expected  to  strongly and positively  impact  the  amount  of  FDI  inflows. 
However,  foreign investors at  the same time hope to avoid high transactional  and labor 
costs, barriers to establishing private businesses,11 and overregulated labor markets.  As the 
scope of civil  rights increases, transactional and labor costs also rise as a product of the 
increasing  strength  of  trade  unions,  collective  bargaining,  and  some  nongovernmental 
organizations (e.g., those that oppose trade and labor market liberalization or work to protect 
the environment), which produces decreasing returns to civil rights. 
Regarding transactional costs, there are two types clearly taken into account by the 
civil rights index. First, since barriers to establish private businesses increase the initial costs 
of  starting  any new business,  they  matter  when foreign  investors  make  decisions  about 
where  to  invest.   Second,  the  Freedom House  Index  takes  into  account  excessive  state 
control  of  travel  or  choice  of  residence  as  barriers  and  disproportionate  freedom  of 
organization for “anti-market¨ nongovernmental organizations.
The demands of relatively powerful trade unions can create and increase labor costs 
to  potential  investors  from hiring,  firing,  and  paying  relatively  high  minimum salaries. 
Substantial  empirical work supports this theoretical statement. For instance, Javorcik and 
Spatareanu´s results (2004) suggest that greater flexibility in the host country´s labor market 
in absolute terms or relative to the investor´s home country is associated with larger FDI 
inflows. In addition,  Besley and Burgess (2004) find that pro-worker amendments to the 
11 Because barriers to establishing private businesses increase the initial costs of starting any new business, 
they matter when foreign investors make decisions about where to invest.  In relation to the Freedom House 
Index, it takes into account excessive state control of travel or choice of residence, and disproportionate 
freedom of organization for nongovernmental organizations as barriers.
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Industrial Disputes Act were associated with lowered investment, employment, productivity, 
and output in registered manufacturing from 1952 to 1992 in India. Likewise, Botero et al  
(2004) state that labor regulation generates costs without benefits.12 
Specifically,  those  civil  rights  that  tend  to  increase  transactional  and labor  costs 
might exert a more durable influence on FDI inflows than those associated with enforcement 
of the law. As opposed to indefinite negative effects on FDI inflows due to increases in 
transactional and labor costs, improvements in the enforcement of laws might exert only a 
limited or truncated positive impact on FDI inflows over time. Once a certain level of legal 
enforcement has been reached, the positive impact on FDI inflows of this determinant may 
decline and eventually disappear.  
In other words, while enforcement of the law would produce a positive but limited 
effect  on  attracting  foreign  direct  investment,  any increase  in  transactional  costs  would 
always  raise  marginal  costs  and  discourage  foreign  investors.   Thus,  combining  the 
relatively more rapid decay of the positive impacts of legal enforcement with the negative 
and indefinite effect of increases in transactional and labor costs might produce decreasing 
returns to civil rights. This assertion appears promising for further research,13 which might 
reveal important implications for politicians and policy-makers in determining which and 
how civil rights should be implemented or modified to maximize FDI inflows, if in fact that  
becomes a priority.
12 More precisely, Botero et al (2004) find that heavier regulation of labor causes lower labor force 
participation and higher unemployment, especially for the young.
13 Given the highly volatile nature of FDI inflows, a panel data regression controlling for a reasonable time 
span becomes the most appropriate method of evaluation. Unfortunately, Freedom House only reports 
disaggregated data (“subcategory scores”) on civil rights since 2005 (only 4 periods).  
13
After assuming the presence of decreasing returns to civil rights (in terms of FDI 
inflows), the relationship between FDI inflows and the scope of civil rights can be modeled 
through a curvilinear function as follows:
FDI inflows = β * CR  +   θ *  CR2 (1)
In this formula, FDI represents foreign direct investment, and CR the scope of civil rights. 
The  top  quadrant  of  figure  1  shows  how  civil  rights  relate  to  FDI  inflows;  given  the 
quadratic relationship existing between them, the second graph in figure 1 displays positive 
but decreasing returns to civil rights.
[ Figure 1 Here ]
Therefore, as a product of how these components influence FDI inflows, a second 
hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 2:  The impacts of increases in civil  rights on FDI inflows present  
positive but decreasing returns.14 
As a consequence, a certain scope of civil rights should maximize -- ceteris paribus 
-- the amount of FDI inflows.  Such a level would guarantee a scenario where the judiciary 
would not be totally controlled by the state (and there would be strong rule of law), and 
while, trade unions and NGOs could not simultaneously operate in an over-regulated labor 
market.15    
Research Design and Method
14 At some point, these marginal impacts could become negative as the transactional and labor costs increase 
with the polity producing increases in the “amount” of civil rights.
15 Mathematically, negative returns for transactional costs would equal the positive returns for levels of legal 
enforcement.
14
Testing  this  phenomenon  of  decreasing  returns  in  recently  democratized  polities 
becomes the most appropriate option, given the potentially higher levels of sensitivity or 
elasticity between FDI inflows and civil rights, which are likely to be depressed following 
periods of democratization. Given that civil rights present depressed levels in their scope 
before periods of democratization, the marginal impact of any increase in civil rights´ scope 
on  FDI  inflows  is  highest  (during  a  certain  period  of  time  immediately  following 
democratization) when assuming the existence of these positive but decreasing returns to 
civil rights. Hence, testing the dynamics and behavior of this assumption over time becomes 
critical to verify the existence of this phenomenon.
Considering the relatively recent and massive democratization experiences in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, these two regions constitute an ideal setting for this study.  First, 
given that countries within these two regions saw massive waves of democratization prior to 
the selected periods of analysis (1985-2003 for Latin America and 1991-2003 for Eastern 
Europe),  the  selection  of  these  regions  becomes  convenient.  In  addition,  studying  these 
regions provides an opportunity to construct a compact database for a panel data regression 
in which all countries included have recently democratized.  This allows us to evaluate the 
existence and characteristics of this phenomenon over time.   I excluded other democracies 
from my sample  for two reasons.  First,  each wave of democratization  presents  different 
characteristics from the rest of waves (Huntington 1991; Chull  Shin 1994).16 In fact, the 
16 Samuel Huntington distinguishes the wave of democratization under study in this paper from the others. 
Huntington argues for a shift in the research focus from causes to causers of democratization. Huntington 
proposed this shift since he observed so many democratizing countries (in the wave of democratization 
employed in this study) lacking the necessary or sufficient conditions for democracy that had characterized 
other waves of democratization. More precisely, democratization and democratic consolidation in this wave 
responded to a combination of factors – formula not present in other waves. Chull Shin (1994) takes the 
distinctiveness of Huntington´s argument even further to state that ¨in Eastern Europe and Latin America, 
many authoritarian regimes lost legitimacy simply because they failed to solve the economic and other 
15
magnitude and elasticity of the returns to civil  rights on FDI inflows might significantly 
change  from  one  wave  of  democratization  to  another  one.  Combining  democracies 
belonging to different waves may distort the estimations without any valid generalization.17  
Second,  this substantial increase in FDI inflows coincided with the implementation 
of  market-oriented  reforms  in  both  regions.18 Overall,  both  regions  embarked  on  the 
implementation  of  market-oriented  programs  and  initiated  processes  of  political 
consolidation. This coincidence allows the econometric analysis in this study to remain as 
parsimonious  as  possible.  This  particular  combination  of  these  political  and  economic 
reforms could have created special  dynamics,  which might have triggered FDI inflows.19 
Other regions and countries have also democratized; however, they did not always adopt 
market-oriented reforms. Indeed, including these other democracies or other regions into the 
problems that had allowed them to take power in the first place….In Eastern Europe, for example, international 
factors played the more influential role. By contrast, in the majority of democratic transitions in Latin America, 
domestic factors played the more powerful role. Despite such differences, it is this confluence of domestic and 
international factors that distinguishes the current wave from the previous ones ¨ (152). As I note below, this 
key difference between Latin America and Eastern Europe is accounted by my model. 
After excluding this difference, the other common characteristics belonging to this wave and these two regions 
make these regions – Eastern Europe and Latin America -- suitable to be employed in my study. In general, 
including other cases, originated from other waves and even other regions, might offer estimations that could 
not be valid for any case in particular. In general, differences among waves and its implications for political 
and economic risk, especially those related to structures (such as industrialization, urbanization, rise of the 
middle class) and actors (relevant for the wave under study) makes necessary a separate analysis.
17 Further research could help test whether this phenomenon also existed, and if this is the case, how the 
magnitude of the decreasing returns has evolved. 
18 The goals of these economic reforms were to adjust the macroeconomies -- by reducing inflation -- and 
improve competitiveness by liberalizing trade, privatizing state-owned companies, and deregulating their 
markets.   These reforms ended the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies in Latin America and the 
socialist centrally-planned economies in Eastern Europe, which had produced economic stagnation in these 
regions during the 1980s. In addition to stabilizing and liberalizing, these economic reforms were implemented 
as incentives to prospective businessmen to invest their financial resources in order to reduce current account 
deficits and reduce unemployment.  For example, Rodrik (1996) argues that several Latin American nations 
initiated these reforms in hopes of signaling good intentions to international investors.  However, after several 
years of economic reforms, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) find that countries where governments implemented 
economic reforms were not always the most effective in attracting FDI flows.  For Biglaiser and DeRouen, the 
reduction of expropriation risk could enhance the effects of domestic financial and trade reform, and bolster 
reinvestment by multinational companies.
19 Both Latin America (since the mid 1980s), and Eastern Europe (beginning in the 1990s, have experienced 
significantly increased inflows of foreign direct investment from other regions (Birch 1991; Grosse 2001).
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study might also distort the estimated magnitude of the marginal returns to civil rights on 
FDI inflows. Therefore, further research is needed to test hypothesis 2 in other settings.20 
Finally, by testing hypothesis 2 only on Latin America and Eastern Europe, the potential 
effects of regional differences are minimized in the model.
Considering the need to test the existence of decreasing returns to civil  rights by 
combining 1) cases (in this case, across countries in two regions), and 2) time; the panel data 
regression becomes ideal to use for periods following the democratization process (1991-
2003).21  If positive but decreasing returns to civil rights exists (on FDI inflows), I shall 
conclude from this regression that those Latin American and Eastern European nations that 
enjoyed  a  scope  of  civil  rights  closer  to  a  maximizing  level  of  civil  rights  (after 
democratizing) were relatively more successful in attracting FDI inflows than those with 
extreme levels.  This particular result is produced by a curvilinear (quadratic) relationship 
between  the  scope  of  civil  rights  and  FDI  inflows.  The  existence  of  this  curvilinear 
relationship can be explained by the presence of decreasing returns to civil rights. 
As noted above, this study tests whether advances in the quality of democracy -- 
specifically concerning civil rights -- create positive but decreasing marginal returns to civil 
rights in attracting foreign direct investment.  I show empirically that in the initial stages of 
20 An econometric analysis including all regions or nations would hardly capture  differences in the types of 
politico-economic dynamics produced by various combinations of economic and political reforms ,or their 
implications for attracting FDI inflows (e.g. political liberalization with no economic reforms might produce a 
different dynamic in attracting FDI inflows).
21 The Latin American countries included in this analysis are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.   The Eastern European nations considered are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine. I purposively exclude 
Paraguay, Belarus, Mexico, and Moldova from the sample due to their authoritarian regimes during most of the 
period selected.
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democratic consolidation, the marginal returns to civil rights are positive, and decrease as 
the quality of democracy improves in Latin America and Eastern Europe.  In order to test the 
regularity of decreasing returns, panel data regressions with feasible generalized least square 
(FGLS)22 estimators are employed.  
In  this  study,  the  dependent  variable  is  FDI  inflows  (measured  in  constant  U.S. 
dollars) that these nations receive from abroad divided by the gross domestic product of the 
host country.23  The key independent variables to test the hypotheses are civil and political 
rights.24 The control variables included in the model are as follows:
GDP  per  capita  (in  constant  U.S.  dollars):  This  indicator  controls  for  a  nation’s 
development and economic performance. By accounting for citizens’ buying capacity in a 
given country,  GDP per capita also captures the magnitude of the market for a potential 
investor. Hence, higher FDI inflows should appear as a response to higher GDP per capita 
levels.   In fact, Campos and Kinoshita (2008) find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between these two variables for Latin America and Eastern Europe.25 
Inflation  rates:  High  rates  of  inflation  are  a  sign  of  economic  instability  for  foreign 
investors, as well as a host government’s inability to maintain healthy monetary policies. 
Foreign companies may avoid countries where governments are institutionally weak or have 
low technical capabilities.  In addition, high inflation or recurrent changes in prices make 
22 A Random Effects Model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). 
23 The resultant ratio was scaled using logarithms and Source: UNCTAD. 2005. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development.
24 Source of the data: Freedom House
25 Source of the data:  International Monetary Fund.
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short-term pricing decisions more costly.  For example, Schneider and Frey (1985) find that 
transnational companies invest less in developing countries with higher rates of inflation.26
Current  account  balance  (constant  U.S.  dollars): Nations  may  finance  their  balance  of 
payments deficits - possibly caused by deficits in current accounts - either by spending their 
official  reserves or attracting more  foreign capital.   If  governments  desire to pursue the 
second alternative, they may modify some policies in order to attract foreign investment. 
Thus, the relationship between current account deficits and FDI inflows should be negative. 
In other words, the larger a country’s current account deficit (negative values for the current 
account balance), the greater that country’s FDI inflows will be.  Schneider and Frey (1985) 
confirm the empirical validity of this relationship in a previous study.27
Global  FDI  (constant  U.S.  dollars):  This  variable  measures  FDI  inflows  in  the  world 
economy.  Given that a relevant portion of this global FDI is captured by Latin America,  
global FDI may exert some relevant influence on what Latin American countries receive 
from abroad.  The model also controls for this exogenous determinant.28
Ideology:  Both economists and political scientists have researched whether differences in 
party ideology can explain differences in fiscal policy.  29  For instance,  Cameron (1978) 
illustrates that the percentage of the government’s electoral base that is composed of social-
democrat  or  labor  parties  can  explain  a  higher  public  spending  share  of  the  GDP  in 
industrialized  countries.   Likewise,  Roubini  and  Sachs  (1988)  find  that  leftist  cabinets 
evince higher levels of public spending. Higher levels of public spending would tend to 
diminish prospects for severe macroeconomic adjustment programs. 
26 International Monetary Fund (IMF): International Financial Statistics.
27 Data source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Balance of Payments.
28 Data source: UNCTAD. 2005. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
29 Lewis-Beck (1988) offers a general discussion on the relevance of left-right ideological orientations.
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During the period under  analysis,  the majority  of  the  countries  in  both regions  – Latin 
America  and Eastern Europe – faced dramatic  macroeconomic  adjustments  and massive 
market-oriented reforms. Within this context, the credibility of the cabinet -- as a function of 
lower (conducive to lower deficits) -- could explain differences in the willingness of foreign 
investors to act. To account for these differences, a trichotomous variable (right=2, center=1, 
left=0)  is  included in the model.  If  rightist  cabinets  tend to generate  more  credible  and 
conservative  fiscal  policies,  then  I  expect  to  see a  positive  coefficient  for  this  variable. 
Since  conservative  policies  would  increase  the  likelihood  of  a  more  predictable 
macroeconomic environment (less risk), foreign investors might prefer such conditions.30  
Literacy:  Human capital levels can also represent an important determinant of FDI inflows. 
Given that foreign investors are interested in maximizing profits, they will be more willing 
to  invest  in  countries  that  have  greater  productivity  levels.   In  regard  to  this  potential 
determinant, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) find a positive relationship between human 
capital and FDI inflows. Likewise, Noorbakhsh and Paloni’s (2001) empirical findings point 
out that (a) human capital is a statistically significant determinant of FDI inflows; (b) human 
capital is one of the most important determinants; and (c) its importance has increased over 
time.  Rates of literacy are utilized here as a proxy for human capital.  Given the potential 
positive  impact  of  human  capital  on  FDI  inflows,  a  positive  sign  is  expected  for  the 
coefficient of this variable.31
Majority:  Haggard and McCubbins (2001) characterize polities along with two dimensions 
of institutions:  separation of power, and separation of purpose.  Separation of power and 
30 Data source: World Bank, Database of Political Institutions.
31 Data source: United Nations Statistics.
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separation  of  purpose  establish  a  trade-off  regarding  policy-making:  decisiveness  vs. 
resoluteness.   On  the  one  hand,  decisiveness  is  characterized  by  the  ease  with  which 
government can enact and implement policy change.  As the effective number of vetoes 
decreases,  the  polity  becomes  more  decisive  and  less  resolute  (e.g.,  at  one  extreme  an 
authoritarian  government  could  enact  but  would  have  no  credibility  to  adhere  to  those 
policies).  Resoluteness, on the other hand, is the ability to stick with a certain policy once it 
has been passed.  As the effective number of vetoes increases, the polity becomes more 
resolute and less decisive (e.g. polities with very fragmented party systems could not enact 
or implement changes to improve policy performance). 
Given this, potential foreign investors will prefer to invest in more-decisive polities if those 
governments are implementing or committing to market-oriented reforms. This is precisely 
the case of Latin America and Eastern Europe during the period under study.  At the same 
time, political stability and government commitment to existing policies reduce risk levels in 
the economy – information that is crucial for investors when making portfolio decisions.  In 
order to account for the level of decisiveness, the ratio of total seats divided by government 
seats is employed as a proxy. It is expected that an increase in the number of seats for the 
government will make the polity more decisive, and consequently less attractive to foreign 
investors.32  In order to reflect the potential existence of a trade-off between decisiveness 
and resoluteness,  a  quadratic  term of  this  variable  is  included to gauge whether  loss of 
resoluteness reduces positive impacts of decisiveness on the attractiveness of markets for 
investors when governments implementing market-oriented reforms.
32  Data source: World Bank, Database of Political Institutions.
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Dummy  for  Eastern  European  Countries: A dummy  for  Eastern  European  countries  is 
included to capture the potential influence of the prospective European Union membership. 
The assumption is based on the idea that this expected membership might play a relevant 
role in attracting export-platform FDI (Resmini 2000; Bevan and Estrin 2000). 
Statistical Results and Additional Testing
Table 1 shows the results of estimations for four different specifications. In order to 
control  for  the  presence  of  autocorrelation  of  first  order  AR(1)  and heterokedasticity,  a 
three-step feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator was chosen for panel data 
models.33    
[ Table 1 Here ]
Based on the results,  the impact  of political  rights on the flows of foreign direct 
investment  is  not  conclusive  in  supporting  hypothesis  1.  Neither  the  coefficient  for  the 
political  rights  variable  nor  the  quadratic  political  rights  term  matters  in  the  first  two 
specifications when explaining FDI inflows (consistent with hypothesis  1). To verify the 
irrelevance of these explanatory variables in explaining FDI inflows, the polity2 index is 
also  employed.  Similar  to  the  political  rights  index,  it  measures  procedural  democracy 
features. Both specifications -- third and fourth – do not exhibit a statistically significant 
effect  for these on FDI inflows. To sum up, once countries  have already democratized, 
improvements in political rights do not seem to substantially alter FDI inflows.  
33 This estimator allows estimation in the presence of heterocedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelation within panels 
(Greene 2003; Maddala 2001). I also lag the dependent variable and include it as an additional independent 
variable in order to evaluate whether previous FDI inflows affect future flows in my sample. As the FDI 
literature commonly states, the expectation is that FDI does not respond immediately to changes in economic 
and political conditions. 
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With respect to the coefficients reflecting the impact of civil rights on FDI inflows, 
the  coefficients  show  positive  and  statistically  significant  values  in  all  specifications, 
consistent with hypothesis 2.  Estimated coefficients for the square of civil rights are also 
statistically  significant  and  negative  in  all  specifications,  confirming  the  validity  of 
hypothesis 2. Similar results in all model specifications display high levels of robustness for 
the two coefficients associated with civil rights.34  Given these results, I conclude that  the 
impact  of  increases  in  the  scope  of  civil  rights  on  FDI  inflows  points  to  positive  but 
decreasing returns.  As a consequence, only a certain scope of civil rights can maximize -- 
ceteris paribus -- the amount of FDI inflows.  
Graph 1  shows the  maximum level  of  FDI  considering  different  scopes  of  civil 
rights, while holding other variables constant. The curve was constructed by accounting for 
the coefficient value of the civil rights variables in the panel data regression (shown in Table 
1). Since only the dependent variable (FDI inflows) was scaled using logarithms, graph 1 
reflects the relationship between civil rights and FDI inflows shown in the bottom quadrant 
of figure 1. This graph shows that only a scope of civil rights over the value of 6.3 (in a 1-7  
scale)  could  produce  negative  returns.  This  finding  ensures  policy  makers  that  any 
expansion in the scope of civil rights almost always guarantees greater FDI inflows despite 
its changing effectiveness (as the scope of civil rights is expanded).
[ Graph 1 Here ]
34 Two different robustness checks are employed regarding the statistical significance of the civil rights 
coefficients. First, these estimated coefficients (statistically significant) are robust to any change in the models 
– more precisely, to any combination of independent variables. Second, I test whether the panel model presents 
a non-stationarity structure. Through a test inspired from Fisher´s work (1932), Maddala and Wu (1999) 
propose a non-parametric test that is a better test than the Levin-Lin (LL) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel data 
unit root tests. Given that the test is applied to a model with a nonzero drift, the Fisher´s test is used in its 
Phillips and Perron (1988) version. The test fails to reject stationarity as the null hypothesis.
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Other variables that render statistically significant coefficients are the dummy for 
Eastern  European  countries  (prospect  of  European  Union  membership),  current  account 
balance,  GDP per capita of the host country,  the lagged dependent variable,  global FDI, 
majority (and its square), and literacy rates as a proxy for human capital.  All estimations of 
the coefficients for these variables present the expected signs, as discussed above.  However, 
coefficients  of  the variables  for inflation,  ideology do not rise to  statistical  significance. 
Several free trade agreements signed by Latin American nations may have mitigated the 
effects of prospective European Union membership for attracting FDI inflows (Ponce 2008). 
Because reducing inflation and plans for macroeconomic stabilization were a priority in both 
regions regardless of government ideology or legislative composition during the selected 
period, rates of inflation and the ideological orientation of the government do not appear to 
matter.
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study.  In general, it appears that the 
design  of  certain  institutional  rules  may  still  alter  the  amount  of  FDI  inflows  after 
democratization occurs. First,  advances  in the quality of democracy --  specifically  those 
concerning civil rights -- present decreasing marginal returns to civil rights in attracting FDI 
inflows.  Empirical evidence points out that in the initial stages of democratic consolidation, 
marginal returns to civil  rights become positive and decline as the quality of democracy 
improves in Latin America and Eastern Europe. However, as the quality of democracy or 
democratic  consolidation  progresses  in  accord  to  broader  definitions  of  democracy (e.g. 
Dahl (1971)), the marginal returns to civil rights decline to eventually become negative. 
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Second,  I  contend  that  those  Latin  American  and  Eastern  European  countries 
expanding  their  civil  rights  after  democratizing  were  more  successful  in  attracting  FDI 
inflows  relative  to  those  nations  with  extreme  levels  (except  if  the  scope  exceeded  a 
relatively high scope of civil rights (6.3)). Moreover, this study offers important lessons for 
politicians and policy-makers. On the one hand, if the maximization of FDI inflows becomes 
a priority -- for boosting economic growth and development -- they must selectively increase 
the  scope  of  civil  rights. Specifically,  if  this  maximization  goal  becomes  the  aim  of 
policymakers, they will balance (equalize) the negative marginal returns of transactional and 
labor costs with the positive marginal returns from more stringent legal enforcement.  Under 
this scenario, the total marginal returns to civil rights should equal zero.  Further research is 
also suggested for estimating (separately) the marginal impact of increases in these types of 
civil  rights  – transactional,  labor  costs,  and legal  enforcement  --  on the amount  of  FDI 
inflows.
Third, greater decisiveness augments the chances of increasing FDI inflows. Like the 
scope  of  civil  rights,  decisiveness  also  presents  decreasing  returns.  Since  both  regions 
actively pursued market-oriented reforms, greater decisiveness can provide a proxy of the 
effectiveness of governments in changing rules and creating a more favorable environment 
to  attract  foreign  direct  investment.  As  expected,  when  decisiveness  increases,  the 
government loses credibility in adhering to adopted policies. At the same time, this loss of 
resoluteness increasingly diminishes the ability of government to stick with policies which 
might favor potential investors.    Further empirical research could confirm the validity of 
this  trade-off in explaining the behavior of FDI inflows notwithstanding the presence of 
market-oriented reforms.
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Finally,  this  project  moves  beyond  these  normative  considerations  to  evaluate 
positively whether political and civil rights can contribute to economic development through 
greater FDI inflows.  This paper illustrates that political scientists might face a “tragedy” 
when they make normative  assumptions  about  the goodness and convenience  of always 
“more  democracy”  in  their  research  (Ricci  1984).  Once  again,  the  empirical  results 
challenge these normative presuppositions, which view “more democracy” as always being 
best for a society.
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Tables 
Table 1.- Panel data model for Latin America and Eastern Europe (1991-2003)
Dependent variable: Inward FDI/GDP 
(log)
Inward FDI/GDP 
(log)
Inward FDI/GDP 
(log)
Inward FDI/GDP 
(log)
FGLS estimator FGLS estimator FGLS estimator FGLS estimator
Lagged FDI/GDP (log) (-1) .666***
(.051)
.667***
(.051)
.658***
(.052)
.659***
(.052)
Civil rights .540**
 (.269)
.550**
 (.271)
.522**
(.267)
.537**
(.272)
Civil rights^2 -.135***
(.046)
-.133***
(.046)
-.131***
(.046)
-.133***
(.047)
Political rights .020
 (.038)
-.123
 (.116)
Political rights^2 .024
(.018)
Polity2 -.014
(.021)
-.044
(.078)
Polity2^2 .002
(.005)
Dummy  for  Eastern  European 
countries
-.142*
(.074)
-.147**
(.074)
-.161**
(.078)
-.146*
(.082)
GDP  per  capita  of  the  host 
country 
-.00009***
(.00002)
-.00009***
(.00002)
-.00009***
(.00002)
-.00009***
(.00002)
Current account balance -.028***
 (.006)
-.029***
 (.006)
-.028***
(.006)
-.028***
(.006)
Inflation (log) -.023
(.023)
-.019
 (.023)
-.026
(.023)
-.025
(.023)
Global FDI (log) .058
(.051) 
.052
(.051) 
.059
(.051)
.059
(.051)
Ideology .015
 (.034)
.019
 (.035)
.011
(.035)
.015
(.036)
Literacy (log) 1.009*
 (.523)
.808
 (.540)
1.085**
(.541)
.992*
(.556)
Majority  (log):  Ln(Total 
seats/government seats)
-3.368*** 
(1.27)
-3.553*** 
(1.27)
-3.405***
(1.240)
-3.486***
(1.244)
Majority^2 (log) .449***
(.170)
.468***
(.170)
.453***
(.166)
.462***
(.166)
Constant 1.935
 (3.741)
3.459
 (3.88)
1.886
(3.767)
2.516
(3.863)
Number of observations 197 197 197 197
Number of groups 23 23 23 23
Wald Test 638.34*** 670.65*** 642.85*** 647.48***
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1. Decreasing returns to civil rights
Graphs
Graph 1. Civil Rights and Foreign Direct Investment Ln(FDI inward/GDP) in both regions  
(decreasing returns to civil rights)
